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Early stopping of a clinical trial for evidence of benefit hasbeen widely debated in the medical literature.1–13 This
practice has important implications from many viewpoints:
clinicians who practice evidence-based medicine; future pa-
tients to whom the results of research studies apply; patients
who voluntarily agree to participate in clinical trials; and
scientists, investigators, and regulators who strive to balance
conducting scientifically rigorous studies with disseminating
data that support therapeutic advances as quickly as is
reasonable.
During the 7th Global Cardiovascular Clinical Trialists
Forum held in Paris, France, in December 2010, cardiovas-
cular clinical trialists, biostatisticians, National Institutes of
Health scientists, regulators, and pharmaceutical industry
scientists met to discuss current issues related to cardiovas-
cular clinical trials, including the topic of stopping a clinical
trial early for benefit. The Eplerenone in Mild Patients
Hospitalization and Survival Study in Heart Failure
(EMPHASIS-HF) is a recent trial that was stopped early for
benefit14 and was used as a stimulus for discussion. This
report summarizes the results of the group’s discussion on the
scientific, statistical, and practical issues regarding the topic
of stopping a clinical trial early for benefit.
The EMPHASIS-HF Experience
EMPHASIS-HF was a randomized, double-blind, clinical
trial of eplerenone compared with placebo, in addition to
maximally tolerated doses of an angiotensin-converting en-
zyme inhibitor, angiotensin receptor blocker, and -blocker
(unless contraindicated) in patients with mild (New York
Heart Association class II) heart failure symptoms and left
ventricular ejection fraction 30% (35% was allowed for
patients with QRS duration 130 ms).14 The primary end
point was death from cardiovascular causes or hospitalization
for heart failure. This trial was of particular clinical relevance
because it was the first trial of a mineralocorticoid receptor
antagonist in heart failure patients with mild symptoms.
EMPHASIS-HF was monitored by an independent data
monitoring committee (DMC) with 2 prespecified interim
analyses and a stopping guideline of P0.001 for benefit on
the primary end point. The study initially planned to enroll
2584 patients when recruitment began in March 2006. The
sample size was increased to 3100 patients in June 2009
because the blinded overall event rate was lower than
anticipated.
In May 2010, after the second interim analysis, the DMC
reported to the executive committee chairs that the prespeci-
fied stopping boundary had been crossed, with benefit favor-
ing eplerenone as regards the primary composite end point of
cardiovascular death or heart failure hospitalization, analyzed
as time to first event. Based on this information, the full
executive committee decided to stop the trial in May 2010
after 2737 patients had been enrolled. The available interim
results at that time included a total of 559 patients with a
reported primary event (231 eplerenone and 328 placebo,
log-rank P0.00001). Ninety percent of these events had
been adjudicated by the clinical end point committee (CEC).
The final published results were consistent with the findings
from the interim analyses. The eplerenone group had 249
patients with a primary event compared with 356 in the
placebo group (P0.00001); 171 patients died in the epler-
enone arm compared with 213 in the placebo arm
(P0.008).14
The decision to stop the EMPHASIS-HF trial was made on
the basis of several principles. First, the decision was consis-
tent with the prespecified stopping guidelines in the DMC
charter. Second, the level of statistical significance observed
on the interim analysis minimized concerns that the finding
might reverse or reflect the play of chance. Third, the findings
were consistent when the components of the primary end
point were evaluated individually. Finally, the results were
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consistent with previous trials of mineralocorticoid receptor
antagonists.15,16
One concern about stopping early raised during the exec-
utive committee and DMC discussions was the possibility of
missing a beneficial effect of eplerenone on survival. At the
time of the second interim analysis, some evidence of
improved survival was observed, but the strength of evidence
was borderline (P0.044). Consideration was given to con-
tinuing the trial until the survival benefit was more definitive
because of the possibility that the evidence of survival benefit
might not persist once all data were collected and analyzed
(eg, the end result could be P0.05). The rationale in support
of not stopping was based on the opinion that if eplerenone
indeed improved survival as suggested by the interim data,
then it would be important to enhance the degree of confi-
dence around the benefit. The argument to continue the trial
to fully evaluate the effect of eplerenone on mortality was
compelling because no pharmacological agent had been
shown to improve survival in patients with heart failure and
mild symptoms since the emergence of the -adrenergic
blockade data in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the executive
committee ultimately decided to stop the trial early. Although
mortality reduction was clearly an important matter, it was a
secondary end point and was not the end point on which the
prespecified stopping guidelines were based. Importantly, the
executive committee believed that, given the marked effect
on the primary end point that was clearly established beyond
reasonable doubt, there was no longer clinical equipoise,
raising ethical issues for continuing the trial, particularly for
those patients randomly assigned to placebo. Additionally,
the integrity of the trial could have been compromised had the
trial continued because unblinded results were known to the
executive committee chairs.
Challenges and Implications for Stopping a
Trial Early
End Point Considerations
Determining the most appropriate choice of end points for the
primary efficacy outcome and stopping guidelines is a critical
decision point for executive committees and DMC members.
Clinical relevance is, of course, a primary driver of end point
selection. However, other operational factors such as achiev-
able sample sizes, expected event rates, and intended duration
of a trial also play a role. Thus, executive committees may
choose to assign a composite for the primary end point and
evaluate all-cause mortality as a secondary end point. It may
be reasonable for DMCs and executive committees to con-
sider using mortality to define the stopping boundary in such
cases rather than or in addition to the primary composite end
point. This may be especially important when evaluating
mortality is of particular clinical interest, because there is a
risk of missing an important effect on secondary end points
(such as mortality) when trials are stopped early for benefit.
Although a composite end point may be appropriate as a
primary clinical end point, it may be less desirable as the only
end point for predefined stopping boundaries for several
reasons. First, endpoints that require subjective decision-
making (revascularization or hospitalization) are sometimes
difficult to interpret and probably should not be used to stop
a trial early for benefit. Second, it is possible for an overall
composite end point to demonstrate a favorable effect but the
effect may be neutral or negative in one of the individual
components. For a trial to stop early for benefit, the observed
effect on the composite end point ideally should be consistent
in the individual components. In the Heart Outcomes Preven-
tion Evaluation (HOPE) trial, the primary composite end
point was positive early in the trial, but the DMC waited to
recommend stopping the study until all components of the
primary were positive.17
The Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes Trial–Blood
Pressure Lowering Arm (ASCOT-BPLA) is another interest-
ing case example of a trial stopped early for benefit.18 The
study was designed to evaluate the superiority of an
amlodipine-based antihypertensive regimen as compared
with an atenolol-based regimen on the primary end point of
nonfatal myocardial infarction and fatal coronary heart dis-
ease. The DMC recommended stopping the trial early after
interim analyses indicated that patients randomly assigned to
the amlodipine-based regimen had a lower incidence of fatal
and nonfatal stroke (230 versus 390, P0.0001). However,
this was not part of the primary end point (myocardial
infarction and fatal coronary heart disease, 315 versus 354,
P0.14). After much debate, the trial’s executive committee
decided the trial should continue. One year later, the DMC
again recommended stopping because there now were signif-
icantly fewer deaths on the amlodipine-based regimen. The
executive committee stopped the trial at that time despite the
fact that the primary end point was still not significantly
different between treatment groups. The final published
results based on 19 257 patients with a median 5.5 years of
follow-up were as follows for amlodipine versus atenolol:
stroke, 327 versus 422, P0.0003; myocardial infarction and
fatal coronary heart disease, 429 versus 474, P0.11 (the
primary end point); cardiovascular death, 263 versus 342,
P0.001; and all-cause death, 738 versus 820, P0.02.18 In
this example, the primary end point included fatal coronary
heart disease, an end point requiring adjudication of a specific
cause of death. As is well known to clinical investigators, it
is often very difficult to provide unambiguous determinations
of causes of death. Thus, the recommendation of the DMC
and the decision of the executive committee might have been
influenced by the less ambiguous results relating to stroke
and all-cause death.
A consistency of effect may be desirable for some com-
bined end points and their individual components, but it may
not be necessary for others. In a trial that used a combined
end point of cardiovascular mortality and heart failure hos-
pitalization, an effect on heart failure hospitalization without
a strong trend on cardiovascular mortality would not be a
compelling reason to stop the trial early for benefit, due to the
subjectivity of the end point and its variability among patients
and regions of the world. However, in a trial that used a
combined end point of cardiovascular mortality or stroke, a
strong effect on stroke might be compelling without a corre-
sponding effect on death from other cardiovascular causes.
DMC recommendations should not only depend on the primary
composite end point, but it should also include careful consid-
eration of the direction, magnitude, and strength of benefit in the
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individual components (and all-cause mortality), as well as the
potential for knowledge to be gained (or lost) if the trial is
stopped early.
Effect of Stopping Early on Knowledge of Precision and
Magnitude of Effect
Estimating the magnitude of effect of a new treatment, and
the precision around that effect, is an important contribution
of clinical research toward the advancement of patient care.
Understanding these estimates is critical for number needed
to treat analyses, guidelines development, and cost-
effectiveness research. The ability to determine the true
magnitude and precision of the estimate of the treatment
effect may be lessened when trials are stopped early for
benefit.
Bassler et al1 demonstrate how effects may be overesti-
mated when trials are stopped early. There is a lack of
consensus among clinical trial experts about how statistical
techniques and/or prespecified stopping guidelines can over-
come this bias.2–4 Ensuring that stopping guidelines require
very strong evidence (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and
allow for accrual of an adequate number of events are
important considerations.
The Candesartan in Heart Failure Assessment of Reduction
in Mortality and morbidity (CHARM) trial exemplifies how
results can evolve as the evidence accumulates over time. The
CHARM DMC’s guiding principle was that early termination
would only be recommended when the evidence provided
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the results would
change clinical practice.9 Thus, the predefined statistical
stopping guidelines were based on all-cause mortality, with a
required probability value of 0.001. The CHARM DMC
also required a more stringent threshold (P0.0001) for
stopping within 18 months of the first patient randomly
assigned in the trial, when the numbers of events were
expected to be small.9 In retrospect, this provision was quite
important. By the second interim analysis, a highly signifi-
cant difference in mortality was observed in favor of cande-
sartan, based on 76 deaths in the candesartan arm and 123 in
the placebo arm (P0.0007). Thus, the guideline for stopping
was not reached since it was within the 18-month window. By
the 3rd interim look, the probability value was 0.0002, which
still did not reach the stopping boundary of 0.0001. Al-
though the stopping boundary was reached at the 4th interim
analysis, the DMC recommended that the study continue on
the basis of several factors, one of which was the attenuation
of the hazard ratio for mortality as more events had accrued.9
When the trial was completed, the treatment difference in
mortality between the candesartan and placebo arms was of
borderline significance. In 7599 patients followed for a
median of 3.1 years, there were 886 versus 945 deaths (hazard
ratio [HR], 0.91; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.83–1.00;
P0.055). There was a highly significant difference in the
composite of cardiovascular death and hospitalization for
heart failure (HR, 0.84; 95% CI, 0.77–0.91; P0.0001).
The CHARM data monitoring experience exemplifies how
the magnitude of benefit and the estimate of treatment effect
become more precise (and may sometimes attenuate) as
additional events accrue. Careful consideration should be
given to choosing time points for interim efficacy analyses
because treatment effects tend to be exaggerated early in any
trial. This phenomenon has been described as “regression to
the truth.”9,10 The challenge for DMCs is to avoid stopping a
trial after short follow-up, when the overestimation of effect
is most likely to occur. Establishing a minimum follow-up
period as part of the stopping guidelines is one approach to
minimize this risk, and it is a strategy that is increasingly
requested by regulatory agencies. DMCs and executive com-
mittees must weigh the importance of obtaining a precise
result against the potential risks of allowing research subjects
to continue receiving placebo. The former may be most
important for a new class of therapy, or for a therapy with
which an effect on a major clinically relevant end point has
never been shown, or where safety may still be in question. In
the Cardiac Insufficiency Bisoprolol Study II (CIBIS II), the
DMC recommended the study be stopped after the first
interim analysis revealed a beneficial effect for bisoprolol on
all-cause mortality (P0.001). However, the steering com-
mittee opted to continue the trial because of the uncertainty
surrounding the safety and efficacy of -blocker use in heart
failure at that time. The study was subsequently stopped early
after the 2nd interim analysis revealed similar findings.19
Concerns about precision of results and magnitude of
benefit have led to the criticism of some trials that were
stopped early for benefit. The Justification for the Use of
Statins in Primary Prevention: an Intervention Trial Evaluat-
ing Rosuvastatin (JUPITER) was stopped after the second
interim analysis with 328 events and a median follow-up of
1.9 years. The study reported a 44% reduction in the primary
end point of myocardial infarction, stroke, arterial revascu-
larization, hospitalization for unstable angina, or death from
cardiovascular causes for rosuvastatin as compared with
placebo.20 Some have argued that stopping the trial early
introduced bias and resulted in an unexpectedly large and
rapid treatment effect, factors that inhibit the impact of the
data on clinical practice.21 Another criticism is that “soft” end
points were used as the basis to stop the trial. The study
investigators point to the stringent DMC procedures, which
required that any stopping be based on “statistically extreme
findings” that supported “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in
accordance with conservative stopping guidelines.22 The
investigators noted that the DMC continued the trial for an
additional period of 6 months to further evaluate the certainty
of the magnitude of benefit and until all components of the
end point and total mortality were also reduced significantly
with very small probability values (myocardial infarction,
stroke, and cardiovascular death: relative risk [RR], 0.53;
95% CI, 0.49–0.69; P0.00001; revascularization or hospi-
talization for unstable angina: RR, 0.53; 95% CI, 0.40–0.70;
P0.00001; all-cause mortality: RR, 0.80; 95% CI, 0.67–
0.97; P0.02). The final probability value for the primary
composite end point was 0.00000001.22,23
How many events and what strength of evidence are
enough to achieve adequate statistical certainty that stopping
a trial early for benefit is appropriate? Numerous examples
can be offered in which smaller studies have suggested large
mortality benefits with significant probability values, but
when larger studies were conducted, the mortality effect was
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either neutral or in some cases harmful.24–26 Bassler et al1
rather arbitrarily suggest that the threshold should be 500
events. Agreement among experts has certainly not been
reached that this is an appropriate number because the exact
number depends on the trial’s specific context and previous
experience with the drug.
DMCs must not only consider statistical stopping guide-
lines when making decisions regarding the early termination
of a trial for benefit, but they also must consider the uptake
and acceptance of the result by the clinical community. If the
data are relatively insubstantial, clinicians are skeptical of the
results, and the trial may be viewed as an unnecessary loss of
time, resources and, potentially, lives. On the other hand, the
desire to achieve scientific certainty must be balanced against
the ethical need to provide the best care to study participants
and to avoid delaying the wider awareness of therapeutic
advances. Table 19,14,15,19,27–39 provides a selected summary
of some cardiovascular trials stopped early for benefit and the
implications of stopping.
Totality of the Evidence
The totality of evidence is another important consideration
for DMCs when deciding to recommend stopping early.40–42
Primary, secondary, and safety end points should be consid-
ered, as should the consistency of the effect across multiple
(preferably prespecified) subgroups. Data from previous rel-
evant trials can be used to assess the external validity of the
results. It may also be available from concurrent trials with
the same drug or drug class, but sharing interim data to assess
benefit is generally not advisable. The appropriateness of
sharing interim results among DMCs was discussed at a
previous Cardiovascular Clinical Trialists workshop.43 Rec-
ommending early termination for a trial of a novel, first-in-
class agent should be done cautiously because the ability to
externally replicate the finding will be limited or may not
exist. In these cases, emphasis should be placed on ensuring
an adequate quantity and strength of evidence have accrued
and that the length of follow-up is sufficient, to avoid the
potential of stopping the trial on a spurious “random
high.”10,13 Conversely, for new members of an existing drug
class in which previous positive trials or meta-analyses exist,
the broader totality of evidence can be reviewed. This
practice will help reduce the risk of any exaggerated claim of
therapeutic efficacy.
The Ivabradine and Outcomes in Chronic Heart Failure
(SHIFT) trial was not stopped early. Although a significant
effect was observed at the second interim efficacy analysis on
the end point of cardiovascular death and heart failure
hospitalization (HR, 0.77; P0.0001, thus crossing the pre-
specified significance level of P0.001) as well as all-cause
mortality (HR, 0.77; P0.0014), the trial was continued, in
part because a previous study (in a different population) was
negative.44 In addition, ivabradine was a new agent in a drug
class not previously studied in heart failure; thus, on balance,
the totality of evidence was deemed by the DMC not to be
sufficiently convincing to justify stopping the trial early. It
should be noted that the effect size of the final results were
less than that observed in the interim analysis (cardiovascular
death and heart failure hospitalization: HR, 0.82; 95% CI,
0.75–0.90; P0.0001; all-cause mortality: HR, 0.90; 95%
CI, 0.80–1.02; P0.092).35
Responsibility to Subjects: Treating Participants
After Stopping a Trial Early
Stopping a trial before its planned duration is associated with
operational challenges. When a trial is stopped early for
benefit, investigators have an ethical responsibility to offer
the more effective treatment to all study participants. This
process is less complicated for trials of agents with existing
regulatory approval. However, the introduction of open-label
therapy must be conducted under the review and approval of
the institutional review board for investigational drugs and
for approved drugs if the labeled indication differs from the
disease state under study. The cost of therapy may also be a
limitation for some patients because insurance reimbursement
policies will lag behind the emerging clinical trial evidence.
In EMPHASIS-HF, an eplerenone open-label extension
phase was not included in the original study design. Because
an amendment had to be reviewed by local institutional
review boards, a lengthy interval elapsed between when the
study was stopped and when open-label eplerenone was
available to some patients. In an effort to reduce such delays,
executive committees may consider including plans for tran-
sitioning patients from double-blind to open-label drug in the
original protocol, in the event the study is stopped early for
benefit. In addition, local institutional review or ethics boards
should have processes in place that allow them to expedite the
review of open-label extension studies when evidence of
benefit has been generated that is sufficient to stop a trial
early.
Rapid collection and adjudication of remaining events is
another challenge facing trials that stop early. If a trial is
highly positive, particularly for critical end points such as
mortality, then it is desirable to complete final collection,
analysis, and dissemination of the data as quickly as possible.
During the trial planning phase, the study operations team
should develop processes for data collection, query resolu-
tion, and event adjudication that take place on an ongoing
basis. The goal of these processes should be to receive data
and resolve data queries quickly and to have minimal delay
between the reporting of events and their adjudication. In
large clinical trials, in which multiple organizations are often
involved, these processes consume substantial amounts of
time, and backlogs can and do occur. When a trial is stopped
unexpectedly, these backlogs become even more pronounced.
Methods to streamline these functions while maintaining
quality should be preplanned so that study close-out can be as
short as possible if a trial is stopped early.
Proposed Approaches for Future Trials
There is no substitute for a DMC charter that specifies DMC
responsibilities, guidelines for early termination (for benefit
or for harm), and methods for communication of interim
results to the executive committee (Table 2).43,45 An experi-
enced and well-chosen DMC is also needed that can make
wise judgments when faced with complex issues and evi-
dence pertinent to a potential recommendation to stop (or not
stop) early. This requires that the DMC be able to evaluate the
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Table 1. Selected Examples of Heart Failure Trials That Did and Did Not Stop Early for Benefit
Trial Stopping Procedures End Point for Stopping Length of Follow-Up Stopped Early, Yes or No Final Results
Clinical Implications
(Acceptance/Uptake)
Heart failure
pharmacological
trials
CONSENSUS27 No formal stopping rule
in place
DMC reviewed data every
3 mo for mortality
Actual: 188 d (mean); planned:
12 mo
Yes n253 Cornerstone of HF
management,
guideline-
recommended therapy
All-cause mortality: 50 (39%)
enalapril vs 68 (54%)
placebo, P0.003
GESICA28 DMC reviewed after
one-third and two-thirds
of planned enrollment
All-cause mortality Actual: 13 mo (mean); planned:
2 y
Yes n516 Stopped on random
high, “regression to
truth” with CHF
STAT29
Mortality: 87 amiodarone vs
106 control; RR, 28%; 95%
CI, 4–45%, P0.024
CHF STAT29 Stopping procedures not
described in results
report
Not specified Actual: 45 mo (median) No n674 Follow-up
3 longer, more
patients, more events
than GESICA
Planned: Minimum 1 y Mortality: 131 (39%)
amiodarone vs 143 (42%)
placebo, P0.6
US Carvedilol
Trials30
DMC met periodically to
review blinded results,
no formal rules for
stopping
All-cause mortality for the
stratified trial program (4
individual trials with
nonfatal primary end
points)
Actual: 6.5 mo (median) Yes n1094 At time of publication,
much debate in the
medical community
regarding the
robustness of these
findings; small
numbers of deaths,
short follow-up were
some of the criticisms
Planned: 12 mo Mortality: 22 (3.2%) carvedilol
vs 31 (7.8%) placebo;
P0.001
CIBIS-II19 Peto rule P0.001 for
all-cause mortality
All-cause mortality Actual: 1.3 y (mean) Yes n2647 Results confirmed
observations in US
Carvedilol
Planned: 2 y Mortality: 156 (11.8%)
bisoprolol vs 228 (17.3%)
placebo; HR, 0.66; 95%
CI, 0.54–0.8, P0.0001
MERIT-HF31 Asymmetric
group-sequential
procedure, with
cumulative probability of
stopping early of 0.0036
All-cause mortality Actual: 1 y (mean) Yes n3991 Results consistent
with totality of
evidence
Planned: 2.4 y Mortality: 145 (7.2%)
metoprolol XL vs 217 (11%)
placebo; RR, 0.66; 95%
CI, 0.53–0.81, P0.0062
COPERNICUS32 Truncated
O’Brien-Fleming type
boundary computed with
the Ian-DeMets
procedure
All-cause mortality Actual: 10.4 mo (mean) Yes n2289 Results consistent
with totality of
evidence
Planned: event driven to 900
deaths
Mortality: 130 (11.4%)
carvedilol vs 190 (18.5%)
placebo; RR, 35%; 95%
CI, 19–48%, P0.0014
RALES15 Group sequential
monitoring plan with
Lan-DeMets stopping
boundary and an O’Brien
Fleming spending
function
All-cause mortality Actual: 24 mo (mean) Yes n1663 Wide acceptance,
even in patients not
reflected among study
population
Planned: 3 y Mortality: 284 (35%)
spironolactone vs 386 (46%)
placebo; RR, 0.7; 95%
CI, 0.6–0.82, P0.001
A-HeFT33 Lan DeMets sequential
boundaries
All-cause
mortality (differed from
primary composite end
point of all-cause
death, HF
hospitalization, and
change in quality of life)
Actual: 10 mo (mean) Yes n1050 Accepted and
incorporated as
guideline-
recommended
therapy, although
uptake has been
suboptimal
Planned: 18 mo Mortality: 32 (6.2%) Bidil vs
54 (10.2%) placebo;
HR, 0.57, P0.01
CHARM9,34 Haybittle-Peto rule,
requiring 2-sided
P0.001 for the overall
program using a
log-rank test stratified by
trial; for interim analyses
within 18 mo of
randomization,
P0.0001 was required
All-cause mortality
(differed from primary end
point of overall trial,
which was CV death or
HF hospitalization)
Actual: 37.7 mo (median) No n7599 Guideline-
recommended therapy
in ACE
inhibitor–intolerant
patients or as add-on
therapy
Planned: 2 y (minimum) Primary (CV death or HF
hospitalization); adjusted HR,
0.82; 95% CI, 0.77–0.91,
P0.0001
All-cause mortality; adjusted
HR, 0.90; 95% CI, 0.83–1.00,
P0.032
(Continued)
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data at each interim analysis as well as trends with the
accruing data. Whether or not data from ongoing external
trials can be shared or considered among DMCs has been
discussed previously, but it is generally not advised for
purposes of efficacy evaluations.43 With regard to the deci-
sion to stop early, the DMC charter should specify the roles
and responsibilities of the DMC and whether they are an
advisory or decision-making body. This issue becomes rele-
vant if the executive committee chooses not to accept the
DMC recommendation to stop (or not to stop) early. This
possibility should be considered in the charter. Procedures
should be in place, if possible, that would allow the executive
committee to maintain clinical equipoise, because once the
interim findings are made known to the executive committee,
continuation of the trial could negatively affect the study’s
integrity. Of similar importance is the issue of whether or not
Table 1. Continued
Trial Stopping Procedures End Point for Stopping Length of Follow-Up Stopped Early, Yes or No Final Results
Clinical Implications
(Acceptance/Uptake)
EMPHASIS14 Adaptation of the
Haybittle-Peto stopping
criterion; interim
analyses planned after
271 and 542 primary
end point events
accrued; termination
could be recommended
after 542 primary end
points if 2-sided
P0001
CV death or HF
hospitalization
Actual: 21 mo (median) Yes n2737 Major guidelines
undergoing revision to
include eplerenone for
patients with mild HF
symptoms
Planned: 48 mo Primary (CV death or HF
hospitalization): 249 (18.3%)
eplerenone vs 356 (25.9%)
placebo; adjusted HR, 0.63;
95% CI, 0.54–0.74, P0.001
All-cause mortality:
171 (12.5%) eplerenone vs
213 (15.5%) placebo, adjusted
HR, 0.76; 95%
CI, 0.62–0.93, P0.008
SHIFT35 Peto procedure P0.001
at each of 2 interim
analyses
CV death or HF
hospitalization
22.9 mo (median) No n6505
CV death or HF
hospitalization: 793 (24%)
ivabradine vs 937 (29%)
placebo; HR, 0.82; 95%
CI, 0.75–0.90, P0.0001
All-cause mortality: 503 (16%)
ivabradine vs 552 (17%)
placebo; HR, 0.90; 95%
CI, 0.80–1.02, P0.092
Heart failure
device trials
MADIT36 Triangular sequential
design with prespecified
stopping boundaries
All-cause mortality Actual: 27 mo Yes n196 Accepted,
guideline-
recommended device
therapy
Planned: 5 y Mortality: 15/95 defibrillator
vs 39/101 conventional
treatment; HR, 0.46; 95% CI,
0.26–0.82, P0.009
MADIT II37 Triangular sequential
design with prespecified
stopping boundaries
All-cause mortality Actual: 20 mo (mean) Yes n1232 Accepted,
guideline-
recommended device
therapy
Planned: 2 y Mortality: 105 (14.2%) ICD vs
97 (19.8%) no ICD; HR, 0.69;
95% CI, 0.51–0.93, P0.016
COMPANION38 O-Brien Fleming
implemented by Lan and
DeMets
All-cause death or
all-cause hospitalization
Actual: 14.8–16.5 mo (median)
Planned: Event-driven (1000
events)
Yes n1520
All-cause death or
hospitalization was 68%
pharm vs 56% CRT; HR, 0.81;
95% CI, 0.69–0.96, P0.014,
vs 56% CRT-D; HR, 0.8;
95% CI, 0.68–0.95, P0.01
Accepted,
guideline-
recommended device
therapy
Mortality alone: pharm (77
deaths) vs CRT (131 deaths;
HR, 0.76; 95% CI, 0.58–1.01,
P0.059, vs CRT-D (105
deaths); HR, 0.64; 95% CI,
0.48–0.86, P0.003
MADIT-CRT39 Wang-Tsiatis group
sequential design; 20
interim analyses with
approximately 35 events
each
All-cause death or
nonfatal HF events
Actual: 2.4 y (mean)
Planned: 2 y (minimum)
Yes n1820
Deaths or HF events:
187 (17.2%) CRT-ICD vs
185 (25.3%) ICD only;
HR, 0.66; 95%
CI, 0.52–0.84, P0.001
Guideline
recommendations
have been extended
to NYHA class II on
the basis of this trial
and other recently
completed trials
DMC indicates data monitoring committee; HF, heart failure; RR, relative risk; CI, confidence interval; CHF, congestive heart failure; HR, hazard ratio; ACE,
angiotensin-converting enzyme; CV, cardiovascular; ICD, implantable cardioverter-defibrillator; CRT, cardiac resynchronization therapy; NYHA, New York Heart
Association.
Zannad et al When to Stop a Clinical Trial Early for Benefit 299
 by guest on July 20, 2017
http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
all DMC members have to be in agreement before a recom-
mendation to stop early can be made to the executive
committee. Some may argue that if the data are not compel-
ling enough to achieve agreement among all DMC members,
then the study should not be stopped early. The charter should
contain predefined statistical stopping guidelines. The statis-
tical stopping guideline chosen for a trial should assure that
overwhelming evidence is required to stop the trial early for
benefit. Appropriate statistical methods exist to guide deci-
sions to stop for benefit.40–42 Clinical judgment must also be
integrated into the decision-making process, along with
formal statistical rules. Several previously described exam-
ples (CHARM, SHIFT) illustrate situations in which clinical
judgment outweighed the fact that predefined stopping
boundaries had been crossed. DMC members who are knowl-
edgeable and experienced with these methodologies and their
respective strengths and weaknesses should be involved in
the selection of the stopping guideline.
In addition to these guidelines, the DMC charter should
also give consideration to the extent of evidence that is
needed (eg, the number of events that will be required and/or
the minimum length of follow-up required) before early
termination for benefit can be recommended, as well as the
level of significance that will be required to have sufficient
confidence in the results. Fewer interim looks that occur later
in the follow-up period is one approach that may minimize
the potential of observing a random high.10,13 The DMC
should exercise its judgment on the basis of the stopping
guidelines as well as the totality of evidence, both internal
and external to the trial.
From an operational point of view, we suggest that trial
protocols include a section outlining study procedures that
would apply if the trial is stopped early. Potential items
covered in this section may include:
● Procedures to communicate with subjects and rapidly
schedule close-out visits
● Procedures to rapidly communicate with ethics committees
● Plan to switch patients to active drug (if effective)
● Language in the original consent to cover the possibility of
an open-label active-drug extension phase, with the goal of
minimizing the lag time in transitioning subjects to effec-
tive therapy
● Procedures to rapidly collect outstanding data and resolve
data queries
● Rapid collection of source documents needed to finalize
event adjudication
● Process to rapidly address any pending adjudication
assessments
● Process for expedited adjudication while maintaining high
quality standards
● Confidentiality plan that allows release of necessary infor-
mation to treat patients appropriately without jeopardizing
trial integrity, presentation, or publication of the results
Conclusions
The decision whether to recommend that a trial stop early for
benefit is a major challenge for any DMC. Maintaining the
integrity of the trial and obtaining precise final results must
be balanced against the risks for patients who are randomly
assigned to an apparently inferior treatment and the need to
rapidly disseminate evidence supporting a treatment benefit
to the broader community. The suggestions documented here
may help DMCs anticipate and plan for the challenges they
may face when considering whether or not to stop a trial
early. This dialogue among clinical researchers, scientists,
regulators, and statisticians should continue regarding the
evidential, statistical, and practical issues that arise in data
monitoring and interim analyses so that the overall patients’
best interests can be served.
Acknowledgments
The following individuals were speakers or panelists discussing this
topic at the December 2010, 7th Global Cardiovascular Clinical
Trialists Forum, Paris, France: Jay Cohn, MD; Lawrence Fine, MD;
Gerasimos Filippatos, MD; Mihai Gheorghiade, MD; David
Gordon, PhD; Yasser Khder, MD; Wolfgang Koenig, MD; Alice
Mascette, MD; Roxana Mehran, MD; Marco Metra, MD; Marc
Pfeffer, MD, PhD; Harry Shi, MD; Christian Torp-Pedersen, MD;
John Vincent, MD; Hans Wedel, MD; David Whellan, MD; and
Andrew Zalewski, MD.
Sources of Funding
This report was generated from discussions during the 7th Global
Cardiovascular Clinical Trialists (CVCT) Forum held in Paris,
France, in December 2010. CVCT was organized by the Clinical
Table 2. Considerations for Stopping a Trial Early
Charter considerations (with respect to decisions to stop early)
Role of DMC as advisory or decision-making body and to whom it should
report
Need for full agreement of DMC for early stopping recommendations. If
full agreement not required, proportion of members that must be in
agreement
Predefined statistical stopping boundaries
Clinical parameters that will be considered in decision
Number of events required
Length of follow-up required
Level of significance required
Totality of evidence
Protocol considerations
Procedures to communicate with subjects and rapidly schedule close-out
visits
Procedures to rapidly communicate with ethics committees
Plan to switch patients to active drug (if effective)
Language in the original consent to cover the possibility of an open-label,
active-drug extension phase, to minimize the lag time in transitioning
subjects to effective therapy
Procedures to rapidly collect outstanding data and resolve data queries
Rapid collection of source documents needed to finalize event
adjudication
Process to rapidly address any pending adjudication assessments
Process for expedited adjudication while maintaining high-quality
standards
Confidentiality plan that allows release of necessary information to treat
patients appropriately without jeopardizing trial integrity, presentation, or
publication of the results
DMC indicates data monitoring committee.
300 Circ Heart Fail March 2012
 by guest on July 20, 2017
http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Investigation Center (CIC) Inserm, CHU, and University Henri
Poincare´ of Nancy, France, and funded by an unrestricted educa-
tional grant from Association de Recherche et d’Information en
Cardiologie (ARISC), a non-profit educational organization, in
Nancy, France. ARISC had no involvement in writing the manuscript
or decisions related to submitting for publication.
Disclosures
Dr Zannad was supported by Pfizer, Inc (Steering Committee); Dr
Gattis Stough: INSERM, Centre d’Investigation Clinique, Centre
Hospitalier Universitaire, Nancy, France (travel expense reimburse-
ment to attend CVCT 2010; professional/project management/ad-
ministrative time related to preparation of this report); Dr McMurray:
Pfizer (grants, travel expenses, consulting fee related to EMPHASIS-
HF); Dr Borer: INSERM, Centre d’Investigation Clinique, Centre
Hospitalier Universitaire, Nancy, France (travel expense reimburse-
ment to attend CVCT 2010); Servier, Pfizer, BioMarin, Roche,
Novartis, Takeda (drug development consulting, membership on
DMCs and event adjudication entities); Servier (speaking); Servier
(payment for manuscript preparation); BioMarin (stock/stock op-
tions); Dr Geller: INSERM, Centre d’Investigation Clinique, Centre
Hospitalier Universitaire, Nancy, France (travel expense reimburse-
ment to attend CVCT 2010); National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute, Bethesda, MD (employer); Francis-Taylor (royalties from
2005 textbook Advanced Topics in Clinical Biostatistics); American
Statistical Association (professional travel as 2011 President).
References
1. Bassler D, Briel M, Montori VM, Lane M, Glasziou P, Zhou Q, Heels-
Ansdell D, Walter SD, Guyatt GH, Flynn DN, Elamin MB, Murad MH,
Abu Elnour NO, Lampropulos JF, Sood A, Mullan RJ, Erwin PJ,
Bankhead CR, Perera R, Ruiz CC, You JJ, Mulla SM, Kaur J, Nerenberg
KA, Schunemann H, Cook DJ, Lutz K, Ribic CM, Vale N, Malaga G, Akl
EA, Ferreira-Gonzalez I, Alonso-Coello P, Urrutia G, Kunz R, Bucher
HC, Nordmann AJ, Raatz H, da Silva SA, Tuche F, Strahm B, Djul-
begovic B, Adhikari NK, Mills EJ, Gwadry-Sridhar F, Kirpalani H,
Soares HP, Karanicolas PJ, Burns KE, Vandvik PO, Coto-Yglesias F,
Chrispim PP, Ramsay T. Stopping randomized trials early for benefit and
estimation of treatment effects: systematic review and meta-regression
analysis. JAMA. 2010;303:1180–1187.
2. Korn EL, Freidlin B, Mooney M. Bias and trials stopped early for benefit.
JAMA. 2010;304:157–158.
3. Ellenberg SS, DeMets DL, Fleming TR. Bias and trials stopped early for
benefit. JAMA. 2010;304:158–159.
4. Goodman S, Berry D, Wittes J. Bias and trials stopped early for benefit.
JAMA. 2010;304:157–159.
5. Korn EL, Freidlin B, Mooney M. Stopping or reporting early for positive
results in randomized clinical trials: the National Cancer Institute Coop-
erative Group experience from 1990 to 2005. J Clin Oncol. 2009;27:
1712–1721.
6. Trotta F, Apolone G, Garattini S, Tafuri G. Stopping a trial early in
oncology: for patients or for industry? Ann Oncol. 2008;19:1347–1353.
7. Mueller PS, Montori VM, Bassler D, Koenig BA, Guyatt GH. Ethical
issues in stopping randomized trials early because of apparent benefit.
Ann Intern Med. 2007;146:878–881.
8. Montori VM, Devereaux PJ, Adhikari NK, Burns KE, Eggert CH, Briel
M, Lacchetti C, Leung TW, Darling E, Bryant DM, Bucher HC,
Schunemann HJ, Meade MO, Cook DJ, Erwin PJ, Sood A, Sood R, Lo B,
Thompson CA, Zhou Q, Mills E, Guyatt GH. Randomized trials stopped
early for benefit: a systematic review. JAMA. 2005;294:2203–2209.
9. Pocock S, Wang D, Wilhelmsen L, Hennekens CH. The data monitoring
experience in the Candesartan in Heart Failure Assessment of Reduction
in Mortality and morbidity (CHARM) program. Am Heart J. 2005;149:
939–943.
10. Pocock SJ. When (not) to stop a clinical trial for benefit. JAMA. 2005;
294:2228–2230.
11. Pocock S, Wilhelmsen L, Dickstein K, Francis G, Wittes J. The data
monitoring experience in the MOXCON trial. Eur Heart J. 2004;25:
1974–1978.
12. Psaty BM, Rennie D. Stopping medical research to save money: a broken
pact with researchers and patients. JAMA. 2003;289:2128–2131.
13. Pocock S, White I. Trials stopped early: too good to be true? Lancet.
1999;353:943–944.
14. Zannad F, McMurray JJ, Krum H, van Veldhuisen DJ, Swedberg K, Shi
H, Vincent J, Pocock SJ, Pitt B. Eplerenone in patients with systolic heart
failure and mild symptoms. N Engl J Med. 2011;364:11–21.
15. Pitt B, Zannad F, Remme WJ. The effect of spironolactone on morbidity
and mortality in patients with severe heart failure: Randomized Aldactone
Evaluation Study Investigators. N Engl J Med. 1999;341:709–717.
16. Pitt B, Williams G, Remme W, Martinez F, Lopez-Sendon J, Zannad F,
Neaton J, Roniker B, Hurley S, Burns D, Bittman R, Kleiman J. The
EPHESUS trial: eplerenone in patients with heart failure due to systolic
dysfunction complicating acute myocardial infarction: Eplerenone
Post-AMI Heart Failure Efficacy and Survival Study. Cardiovasc Drugs
Ther. 2001;15:79–87.
17. Yusuf S, Sleight P, Pogue J, Bosch J, Davies R, Dagenais G. Effects of
an angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitor, ramipril, on cardiovascular
events in high-risk patients: the Heart Outcomes Prevention Evaluation
Study Investigators. N Engl J Med. 2000;342:145–153.
18. Dahlof B, Sever PS, Poulter NR, Wedel H, Beevers DG, Caulfield M,
Collins R, Kjeldsen SE, Kristinsson A, McInnes GT, Mehlsen J,
Nieminen M, O’Brien E, Ostergren J. Prevention of cardiovascular events
with an antihypertensive regimen of amlodipine adding perindopril as
required versus atenolol adding bendroflumethiazide as required, in the
Anglo-Scandinavian Cardiac Outcomes Trial-Blood Pressure Lowering
Arm (ASCOT-BPLA): a multicentre randomised controlled trial. Lancet.
2005;366:895–906.
19. CIBIS II Investigators. The Cardiac Insufficiency Bisoprolol Study II
(CIBIS-II): a randomised trial. Lancet. 1999;353:9–13.
20. Ridker PM, Danielson E, Fonseca FA, Genest J, Gotto AM Jr, Kastelein
JJ, Koenig W, Libby P, Lorenzatti AJ, MacFadyen JG, Nordestgaard BG,
Shepherd J, Willerson JT, Glynn RJ. Rosuvastatin to prevent vascular
events in men and women with elevated C-reactive protein. N Engl
J Med. 2008;359:2195–2207.
21. Kaul S, Morrissey RP, Diamond GA. By Jove! What is a clinician to
make of JUPITER? Arch Intern Med. 2010;170:1073–1077.
22. Ridker PM, Glynn RJ. The JUPITER Trial: responding to the critics. Am J
Cardiol. 2010;106:1351–1356.
23. Ridker PM. The JUPITER trial: results, controversies, and implications
for prevention. Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes. 2009;2:279–285.
24. Cohn JN, Goldstein SO, Greenberg BH, Lorell BH, Bourge RC, Jaski BE,
Gottlieb SO, McGrew F III, DeMets DL, White BG. A dose-dependent
increase in mortality with vesnarinone among patients with severe heart
failure: Vesnarinone Trial Investigators. N Engl J Med. 1998;339:
1810–1816.
25. Pitt B, Segal R, Martinez FA, Meurers G, Cowley AJ, Thomas I,
Deedwania PC, Ney DE, Snavely DB, Chang PI. Randomised trial of
losartan versus captopril in patients over 65 with heart failure (Evaluation
of Losartan in the Elderly Study, ELITE). Lancet. 1997;349:747–752.
26. Pitt B, Poole-Wilson PA, Segal R, Martinez FA, Dickstein K, Camm AJ,
Konstam MA, Riegger G, Klinger GH, Neaton J, Sharma D, Thiyagarajan
B. Effect of losartan compared with captopril on mortality in patients with
symptomatic heart failure: randomised trial: the Losartan Heart Failure
Survival Study ELITE II. Lancet. 2000;355:1582–1587.
27. CONSENSUS Trial Study Group. Effects of enalapril on mortality in
severe congestive heart failure: results of the Cooperative North Scandi-
navian Enalapril Survival Study (CONSENSUS). N Engl J Med. 1987;
316:1429–1435.
28. Doval HC, Nul DR, Grancelli HO, Perrone SV, Bortman GR, Curiel R.
Randomised trial of low-dose amiodarone in severe congestive heart
failure: Grupo de Estudio de la Sobrevida en la Insuficiencia Cardiaca en
Argentina (GESICA). Lancet. 1994;344:493–498.
29. Singh SN, Fletcher RD, Fisher SG, Singh BN, Lewis HD, Deedwania PC,
Massie BM, Colling C, Lazzeri D. Amiodarone in patients with con-
gestive heart failure and asymptomatic ventricular arrhythmia: Survival
Trial of Antiarrhythmic Therapy in Congestive Heart Failure. N Engl
J Med. 1995;333:77–82.
30. Packer M, Bristow MR, Cohn JN, Colucci WS, Fowler MB, Gilbert EM,
Shusterman NH. The effect of carvedilol on morbidity and mortality in
patients with chronic heart failure: US Carvedilol Heart Failure Study
Group. N Engl J Med. 1996;334:1349–1355.
31. MERIT-HF Investigators. Effect of metoprolol CR/XL in chronic heart
failure: Metoprolol CR/XL Randomised Intervention Trial in Congestive
Heart Failure (MERIT-HF). Lancet. 1999;353:2001–2007.
32. Packer M, Coats AJ, Fowler MB, Katus HA, Krum H, Mohacsi P,
Rouleau JL, Tendera M, Castaigne A, Roecker EB, Schultz MK, DeMets
DL. Effect of carvedilol on survival in severe chronic heart failure.
N Engl J Med. 2001;344:1651–1658.
Zannad et al When to Stop a Clinical Trial Early for Benefit 301
 by guest on July 20, 2017
http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
33. Taylor AL, Ziesche S, Yancy C, Carson P, D’Agostino R Jr, Ferdinand K,
Taylor M, Adams K, Sabolinski M, Worcel M, Cohn JN. Combination of
isosorbide dinitrate and hydralazine in blacks with heart failure. N Engl
J Med. 2004;351:2049–2057.
34. Pfeffer MA, Swedberg K, Granger CB, Held P, McMurray JJ, Michelson
EL, Olofsson B, Ostergren J, Yusuf S, Pocock S. CHARM Investigators
and Committees: Effects of candesartan on mortality and morbidity in
patients with chronic heart failure: the CHARM-Overall programme.
Lancet. 2003;362:759–766.
35. Swedberg K, Komajda M, Bohm M, Borer JS, Ford I, Dubost-Brama A,
Lerebours G, Tavazzi L. Ivabradine and outcomes in chronic heart failure
(SHIFT): a randomised placebo-controlled study. Lancet. 2010;376:
875–885.
36. Moss AJ, Hall WJ, Cannom DS, Daubert JP, Higgins SL, Klein H, Levine
JH, Saksena S, Waldo AL, Wilber D, Brown MW, Heo M. Improved
survival with an implanted defibrillator in patients with coronary disease
at high risk for ventricular arrhythmia: Multicenter Automatic Defi-
brillator Implantation Trial Investigators. N Engl J Med. 1996;335:
1933–1940.
37. Moss AJ, Zareba W, Hall WJ, Klein H, Wilber DJ, Cannom DS, Daubert
JP, Higgins SL, Brown MW, Andrews ML. Prophylactic implantation of
a defibrillator in patients with myocardial infarction and reduced ejection
fraction. N Engl J Med. 2002;346:877–883.
38. Bristow MR, Saxon LA, Boehmer J, Krueger S, Kass DA, De MT,
Carson P, DiCarlo L, DeMets D, White BG, DeVries DW, Feldman AM.
Cardiac-resynchronization therapy with or without an implantable defi-
brillator in advanced chronic heart failure. N Engl J Med. 2004;350:
2140–2150.
39. Moss AJ, Hall WJ, Cannom DS, Klein H, Brown MW, Daubert JP, Estes
NA III, Foster E, Greenberg H, Higgins SL, Pfeffer MA, Solomon SD,
Wilber D, Zareba W. Cardiac-resynchronization therapy for the pre-
vention of heart-failure events. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:1329–1338.
40. Pocock SJ. Current controversies in data monitoring for clinical trials.
Clin Trials. 2006;3:513–521.
41. Schulz KF, Grimes DA. Multiplicity in randomised trials II: subgroup and
interim analyses. Lancet. 2005;365:1657–1661.
42. O’Brien P. Data and safety monitoring. In: Armitage P, Colton T, eds.
Encyclopedia of Biostatistics. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons;
1998:1058–1066.
43. Borer JS, Gordon DJ, Geller NL. When should data and safety monitoring
committees share interim results in cardiovascular trials? JAMA. 2008;
299:1710–1712.
44. Fox K, Ford I, Steg PG, Tendera M, Ferrari R. Ivabradine for patients
with stable coronary artery disease and left-ventricular systolic dys-
function (BEAUTIFUL): a randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled
trial. Lancet. 2008;372:807–816.
45. DAMOCLES Study Group. A proposed charter for clinical trial data
monitoring committees: helping them to do their job well. Lancet.
2005;365:711–722.
KEY WORDS: clinical trial  clinical trials data monitoring committees  data
interpretation  statistical stopping rules for benefit
302 Circ Heart Fail March 2012
 by guest on July 20, 2017
http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Jeffrey S. Borer, Nancy L. Geller and Stuart J. Pocock
Faiez Zannad, Wendy Gattis Stough, John J.V. McMurray, Willem J. Remme, Bertram Pitt,
When to Stop a Clinical Trial Early for Benefit: Lessons Learned and Future Approaches
Print ISSN: 1941-3289. Online ISSN: 1941-3297 
Copyright © 2012 American Heart Association, Inc. All rights reserved.
75231
is published by the American Heart Association, 7272 Greenville Avenue, Dallas, TXCirculation: Heart Failure 
doi: 10.1161/CIRCHEARTFAILURE.111.965707
2012;5:294-302Circ Heart Fail. 
 http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/content/5/2/294
World Wide Web at: 
The online version of this article, along with updated information and services, is located on the
  
 http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org//subscriptions/
is online at: Circulation: Heart Failure  Information about subscribing to Subscriptions:
  
 http://www.lww.com/reprints
 Information about reprints can be found online at: Reprints:
  
document. Permissions and Rights Question and Answer about this process is available in the 
located, click Request Permissions in the middle column of the Web page under Services. Further information 
isthe Editorial Office. Once the online version of the published article for which permission is being requested 
 can be obtained via RightsLink, a service of the Copyright Clearance Center, notCirculation: Heart Failurein
 Requests for permissions to reproduce figures, tables, or portions of articles originally publishedPermissions:
 by guest on July 20, 2017
http://circheartfailure.ahajournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
